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Abstract
We provide a direct test of the impact of altruism on remittances. From a sample of
Indian migrant workers in Qatar, we elicit the propensity to share with others from
their responses in the dictator game and use it as a proxy for altruism. For the entire
sample, we nd that only migrants' income robustly explains remittances. Altruism
does not seem to matter. However, we document a strong positive relationship
between altruism and remittances for a subset of migrants with a loan obligation,
whereas indirect tests of altruism, typically used in the literature, would fail to
establish this relationship. We explain the role of loan obligations with a standard
remittance model extended with reference-dependent preferences.
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1 Introduction
Altruism is commonly, if not routinely, viewed as one of the most important motives for
remittances in transnational families.1 However, because of its intangibility the actual
impact of altruism on remitting behavior is dicult to evaluate and, therefore, its as-
sessment is typically attempted by indirect tests. A well-known example of such a test
is found in Lucas and Stark (1985), who develop a remittance model with altruism that
predicts remittances decrease in the recipient household's income (or, if aggregated, the
receiving country's agricultural GDP as in Bouhga-Hagbe (2006)). Such indirect tests
face several limitations, the starkest of which is the presence of confounding factors. In
particular, other motives for remittances, e.g., the strategic motive, are also consistent
with a negative relationship between remittances and household income. Furthermore,
data limitations such as the absence of longitudinal data also tend to restrict the in-
vestigator from ruling out competing motives such as moral hazard due to the recipient
household reducing their labor eort in response to remittances.2 Lastly, recent empirical
evidence on the role of asymmetric information on remittance ows further exacerbates
the confounding problem.3 But given the increasing economic signicance of remittances
and the assumed importance of altruism, the existing approach to the study of the altru-
istic motive is hardly satisfactory.
In an attempt to overcome limitations of indirect tests, we provide a direct test of the
impact of altruism on remittances using a measure of altruism borrowed from behavioral
economics. We administered a survey and conducted a behavioral experiment with a
1See Stark (1995), Rapoport and Docquier (2006), and Carling (2008) for reviews of altruism and
other motives for remittances. Aside from its direct role on amounts remitted, altruism can also play a
role in alleviating the problem of lack of enforcement in implicit familial contracts, see Becker (1991)
and Foster and Rosenzweig (2001).
2Cox et al (1998), de la Briere et al. (2002), Rapoport and Docquier (2006), Cox and Fafchamps
(2007), and Yang (2011) provide further examples and discussion.
3Ambler (2015) shows that migrants remit more if their families observe their earnings, implying
that the role of altruism may be overestimated under symmetric information. Also see Seshan and
Zubrickas (2015) and Joseph et al. (2015) for the eects of asymmetric information on the dynamics
of remittances, which, if unaccounted, may render the indirect assessment of altruism biased. Similar
altruism-confounding eects are observed in other recent studies. Ashraf et al. (2015) nd that migrants
save more in their home country if oered greater control over their savings. De Arcangelis et al. (2015)
use an economic experiment to show that labeling remittances for education raises amounts remitted,
and so does increased communication, see Batista and Narciso (2013).
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sample of 105 married male migrant workers from Kerala, India working in Qatar whose
spouses reside in India. The behavioral experiment consisted of tasks measuring social
preferences, including the dictator game in which each participant received 100 Qatari
Riyals (approximately, US $27) and decided how much of that amount to give to another,
anonymous participant. From their responses, we elicit the propensity to share with
others and use it to proxy for each participant's degree of altruism. Our main interest
lies with whether the measured variation in altruism across migrants helps to explain the
observed variation in remittance behavior.
The proposed measure of altruism is widely employed in behavioral economics and
psychology, see Forsythe et al. (1994) and Camerer (2003). An obvious question
arises whether a measure constructed from migrants' sharing propensity with their peers
is adequate for the purpose of assessing the sharing propensity with their own family.
According to the kin-selection theory of Hamilton (1964), altruism will be greater with
stronger degree of kinship. But as argued, e.g., by Kaplan and Gurven (2005), it is
more social connectedness than kinship per se that motivates altruistic behavior among
humans, and the level of altruism varies inversely with social distance irrespective of
the degree of relatedness (Jones and Rachlin (2006), Rachlin and Jones (2008)). This
observation allows us to postulate that our constructed measure is at least positively
correlated with the migrants' intrafamilial sharing propensity due to a high degree of
social connectedness among our sampled migrants who form a close social group as they
reside in the same dormitory-styled accommodations for a substantial period of time.
On many dimensions, the migrants in our sample form a homogeneous group.4 They
are all male, married, blue-collar workers from the same state in India, who have either
partially or fully completed secondary education, are of a similar age and mainly Hindu.
In addition, the characteristics of their households in India are also homogeneous. Yet,
there is one important dimension in which these migrant households dier and which will
4While our sample of 105 migrants is smaller than that in other studies of remittance behavior (but
see Osili (2007) for a related study of the eects of altruism on remittances that uses a sample of similar
size), our design employs behavioral tasks which take time to administer and for which subjects are
paid. This necessarily limits our feasible sample size to one comparable to those used in laboratory
experiments.
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play a signicant role in our analysis. About half of them report having an explicit loan
obligation back home. These loan obligations are economically signicant { primarily
related to home ownership. Nonetheless, migrants who do and do not have loan obliga-
tions tend to be very similar with respect to their socioeconomic background, including
earnings, remittances sent, and reported priorities for remittance uses, which are typically
home related.
In our empirical analysis, we nd no relationship between our measure of altruism
and remittances when the entire sample is considered. This nding conrms our previous
discussion about the complex interdependence of various factors and motives for remit-
tances that, unless accounted for, can annihilate the eect of the altruistic motive. In
this study, we uncover one such confounding factor { the possession of a loan obligation.
We nd that remittances rise with the degree of altruism only for the migrants with a
loan obligation. Specically, the estimated remittance schedule has a smaller intercept
and a larger coecient of altruism for the migrants with a loan obligation than for those
without. It is important to note that the indirect test of altruism based on the recipient
household's income does not lead to the same conclusion.
We argue that our empirical ndings related to the possession of loan obligations are in
line with the basic remittance model of altruism (Lucas and Stark (1985); Stark (1995,
Ch. 1)) extended with reference-dependent preferences. In particular, we introduce a
reference point for remittances, similar to benchmark remittances in Hoddinott (1994),
against which a migrant's utility from remittance is measured.5 The reference point can
be thought of as the amount of money that the migrant is expected to transfer home,
as determined by existing obligations, family needs, or social comparisons. For instance,
Chort et al. (2012) nd that Senegalese migrants in France and Italy face ostracism
and loss of access to services provided by a migrant network of their countrymen in the
host country if remittances sent fall short of the expected norm. We further discuss
the salience of reference dependence for remitting behavior later in the text. Lastly, we
assume loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)): A migrant experiences a positive
5Also see Seshan and Zubrickas (2015) for a model with a threshold for remittances endogenously
determined.
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utility if his remittance is above the reference point and a negative utility if below, with
losses looming larger than gains.
If migrants without loan obligations face more uncertainty about the reference point
for remittances, an assumption that we justify later, we show that the theoretical pre-
dictions of the model closely match our empirical results. An increase in uncertainty
about the reference point raises the risk and resultant disutility of falling short of the
expectations back home if the amount remitted is relatively low, thus, prompting the
loss-averse migrant to increase his remittance. But if the amount initially remitted is
suciently large so that the risk of undershooting the reference point is negligible and
is rather dominated by the risk of overshooting the reference point, then the relation-
ship between remittances and uncertainty turns negative due to the diminishing utility
of remittances past the reference point. Thus, given a positive relationship between re-
mittance and altruism all else equal, the model predicts a atter remittance schedule in
altruism for migrants with less certainty about remittance expectations, i.e., without loan
obligations, in accordance with our empirical results. All in all, the altruistic motive can
be diminished by loss aversion coupled with uncertainty about remittance expectations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
data and compare the characteristics of migrants that report an explicit loan obligation
to those that report none. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis. In Section 4, we
discuss implications for remittances resulting from reference-dependent preferences and
oer an interpretation of our empirical results. The last section concludes the study.
2 Data
Our data come from two sources. First, data on migrants' personal and household char-
acteristics, income, remittances, assets, consumption, and loans were collected through a
survey administered to a sample of migrant workers in Doha, Qatar. To limit heterogene-
ity, we aimed at married, blue-collar workers from Kerala, India, whose spouses remained
behind and who were of Hindu faith and had at most a high-school diploma. A working
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sample of 203 individuals from across seven dormitory-styled accommodations located in
Doha's Industrial Area completed a baseline survey in April and May 2012, conducted by
a local survey rm staed with migrants from Kerala.6 Furthermore, to better control for
individual heterogeneity, the surveyed migrants also completed exercises to gauge their
attitude toward risk involving real payouts.7
Our second source of data comes from the behavioral experiment we conducted with
a subset of the migrant workers who had completed the survey. Specically, a few weeks
after the surveys were completed, we invited all migrants who took part in the survey to
the campus of the Georgetown University in Doha on a weekend to participate in a series
of behavioral games. Transportation was provided. A total of 105 migrants accepted
the invitation. Table A1 in Appendix A shows that attrition is uncorrelated with any
observed characteristic of migrants and their household in India.8
On campus, the migrants played the public good, trust, dictator, and ultimatum
games with real payouts based on earnings in one randomly selected game. For the
present study, which focuses on altruism, we only consider behavior in the dictator game.
In this game, the participants were randomly matched in pairs, but the identity of the
paired participant was never revealed. Each participant was then asked to decide how
much of a 100 Qatari Riyal endowment (approximately US $27, the equivalent of about
two-days worth of the average migrant's salary) he would share with his anonymous
partner.9 The mean and median transfers made in the dictator game were 37% and
6Male interviewers would randomly select one migrant to be interviewed per room at each accom-
modation. We could not explicitly prohibit individuals of other faiths from participating but did so
indirectly by stating that the campus visit would be on a Friday (which is a weekend day in Qatar), the
day when church services were normally held in addition to the mid-day congregation prayer for Muslims.
Some leeway was given to interviewers to enroll individuals with post-secondary education provided that
this group formed a minority of the sample.
7Subjects were asked to choose from one of six choices, each oering two possible rewards depending
on a coin toss. The choices were (1) QR 500 or QR 500 (2) QR 450 or QR 950, (3) QR 400 or QR 1200,
(4) QR 300 or QR 1500, (5) QR 100 or QR 1900 or (6) QR 0 or QR 2000. Lower numbered choices
would reect a greater degree of risk aversion. Workers were told that 40 of them (about 20%) would be
selected at random to be paid for choices.
8Although we invited the migrant workers to come to campus on a weekend, some of them were asked
by their management to work, which mostly explains the attrition.
9The English translation of the instructions of the dictator game from Malayalam, the local language
of Kerala, is available upon request. Along with written instructions, the participants were also shown
voiced PowerPoint presentations about the games played. Additionally, there were Malayalam-speaking
assistants trained to help participants in better understanding the games.
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40% of the endowment, respectively.10 There is a discernible variation in the amount of
endowment that was shared as seen in the non-parametric distribution plotted in Figure
A1 in Appendix A.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
All No Loan Loan Dierence T-test
(1) (2) (3) (2) - (3) p-value
Migrant characteristics
Annual income (US $) 6,456 6,657 6,199 458 0.39
Annual remittances (US $) 3,387 3,414 3,353 61 0.81
Age in years 40.24 40.49 39.91 0.58 0.70
Post high school (indicator) 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.36
Years in Qatar 5.29 5.69 4.76 0.93 0.41
Expected years in Qatar 5.47 5.29 5.70 -0.40 0.56
Altruism 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.00 0.92
Risk attitude 3.32 3.37 3.26 0.11 0.62
Household characteristics
Household income (indicator) 0.25 0.29 0.20 0.09 0.33
Household income (US $) 326.7 449.2 169.5 279.8 0.07
Wealth (US $) 31,029 28,161 34,708 -6,547 0.19
Landholdings (acres) 0.31 0.25 0.39 -0.15 0.11
Wife in SHG (indicator) 0.37 0.25 0.52 -0.27 0.00
Size (excluding the migrant) 3.70 3.81 3.54 0.27 0.16
Own home (indicator) 0.99 0.98 1.00 -0.02 0.38
Number of bedrooms 3.02 3.00 3.04 -0.04 0.72
Motor car (indicator) 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.86
Landline telephone (indicator) 0.62 0.71 0.50 0.21 0.03
Flat panel TV (indicator) 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.01 0.93
Refrigerator (indicator) 0.70 0.71 0.67 0.04 0.68
Computer (indicator) 0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.76
Number of Observations 105 59 46
Notes: Household wealth refer to the total value of cash (in hand, banks, postal accounts),
chitty funds, stocks, gold holdings and landholdings jointly held by the migrant and household
members in Kerala. Only 74 observations were recorded for \Expected years in Qatar" out
of which 41 for the No Loan group.
Column 1 of Table 1 summarizes various individual and household characteristics of
the participating migrants. By design, in our sample there is no variation in gender, place
of origin, type of occupation, and marital status, and only little variation in religion and
educational attainment. The average annual income earned in Qatar was the equivalent
10These numbers fall within the range of mean and median oers observed in similar studies, which is
between 10% and 50% (see Camerer (2003, Table 2.4, pp 57{58)).
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of US$ 6,456 of which 52% was remitted annually. Mean age was 40 years and the
individuals were employed in Qatar for approximately 5.3 years. Only a quarter reported
household members back in Kerala receiving an income, averaging US$ 327 in the past
year.
Loans
One of the key ndings of this study is that loan obligations can potentially aect remit-
tance behavior. Therefore, prior to presenting the empirical analysis we provide a short
description of the loans and a comparison between the migrants with an explicit loan
obligation and those without.
In our sample, 46 migrants (44%) report having a loan obligation back home. Based
on migrants' and their households' characteristics, we observe that these migrants are
similar to the migrants who do not report any loan obligations (see columns 2 and 3 of
Table 1). Both groups exhibit the same average levels of altruism (0.37 as a share of the
endowment oered in the dictator game) and of risk aversion. Furthermore, we nd that
the two groups are similar in terms of not only the amounts remitted but also of how
remittances are reportedly spent (see Appendix B). In all but one three variables (\Other
income", \Wife in self-help group," and \Landline telephone"), the dierence between
the migrants with loans and those without is statistically insignicant at conventional
levels.
To further explore loan behavior, we rst observe that loans are primary taken for
housing investments. In fact, 76% of the migrants with a loan reported that it was taken
to \buy a house, repair/build a house, or buy land" (see Figure 1 that shows migrants'
reasons for existing loans). Those that do not possess a loan share a similar preference for
housing investments. When asked how the household plans to spend future savings, 73%
of the migrants without a loan reported that they would like to \buy a house, repair/build
a house, or buy land" (see Figure B1 in Appendix B).
If housing investments are a priority for both groups, a question arises as to why some
migrant households obtained a loan while others did not. There could be dierences in
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Figure 1: Reasons for Existing Loans
terms of personal and household characteristics or circumstances that, if not accounted
for, would raise concerns about self-selection and omitted variable bias. A probit regres-
sion of loan take-up in Table 2 suggests that higher income and post-secondary schooling
reduces the likelihood of taking a loan while having a wife who is a member of a self-help
group (SHG) and larger landholdings increase the probability of possessing a loan obliga-
tion.11 We also note that the migrant's risk aversion does not matter for loan take-up. In
the ensuing empirical analysis of remittance behavior, we include wife's participation in
a SHG and a host of personal and household characteristics to mitigate concerns about
selectivity.
3 Empirical Model
We now turn to our study of how migrant characteristics, and particularly altruism, aect
remittances. We rst investigate how migrants' background and household characteris-
tics aect remittances. Consider a parsimonious remittance specication that excludes
altruism,
lnR = a+X + Z + ": (1)
11SHGs in Kerala typically consist of women who vouch for each other in fullling their loan obligations
with a participating nancial institution. Spouses involved in SHGs may have better access to loan
opportunities relative to non-participating spouses.
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Table 2: Determinants of Loan Participation (Probit)
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant's income (ln) -0.199* -0.207* -0.145
(0.120) (0.124) (0.169)
Household income (IHST) -0.014 -0.013 -0.033*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.019)
Post high school (indicator) -0.218** -0.178* -0.121
(0.090) (0.099) (0.198)
Risk attitude - -0.025 -0.037
- (0.029) (0.044)
Altruism - - 0.037
- - (0.306)
Wife in SHG 0.171** 0.165** 0.248**
(0.079) (0.081) (0.102)
Landholdings (acres) 0.074 0.060 0.170
(0.060) (0.061) (0.104)
Observations 203 191 105
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for having a loan repayment
obligation. Coecients show the marginal eects. Columns 1 and 2 use the
full sample with the addition of the risk-attitude measure in column 2 (this
measure could not be obtained from 12 individuals). Column 3 is limited to
individuals who participated in campus visit and completed a set of behavioral
games. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses.
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Above, lnR is the log of the annual remittances; X is a vector of migrants' background
characteristics (income, age, risk attitude, and years employed in Qatar); Z is a vector
of household characteristics (size, wife in SHG, income, and wealth), and " is a normally
distributed error term. A dummy variable is used to measure educational attainment,
with a value of 1 if the migrant sought post high-school education, and 0, otherwise. The
results for the entire sample of migrants participating in the behavioral games, the No
Loan and Have Loan groups are reported in columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 3, respectively.
For the entire sample, the only statistically signicant explanatory variable is the mi-
grant's income. A 10 percent increase in foreign income is associated with a 5.9 percent
rise in remittances. Aside from the intercept, no other included variables have explana-
tory power. However, there appear to be dierences for the two groups separately studied,
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Table 3: Determinants of Remittances (OLS)
All No Loan Have Loan
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant's income (ln) 0.586*** 0.554*** 0.667***
(0.077) (0.105) (0.074)
Migrant's age (ln) 0.132 0.269 0.020
(0.112) (0.178) (0.134)
Post high school (indicator) 0.112 0.127 0.088
(0.094) (0.112) (0.166)
Years employed in Qatar (ln) -0.029 0.003 -0.040
(0.031) (0.039) (0.033)
Household size in India 0.014 0.063 -0.013
(0.024) (0.042) (0.027)
Wife in SHG 0.048 0.055 0.035
(0.048) (0.083) (0.050)
Household income (IHST) 0.003 -0.007 0.021***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.006)
Wealth (ln) 0.04 -0.065 0.086*
(0.043) (0.080) (0.051)
Landholdings (acres) -0.037 0.147 -0.112*
(0.048) (0.140) (0.062)
Risk attitude -0.010 -0.023 0.026
(0.025) (0.034) (0.019)
Constant 2.080** 2.682* 1.356*
(0.863) (1.582) (0.756)
R-squared 0.54 0.46 0.79
Number of Observations 105 59 46
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of remittances. Robust standard
errors are displayed in parentheses.
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
as seen in columns 2 and 3. First, all the coecients across the two groups are substan-
tially dierent. Second, for the group of migrants with loan obligations the household's
income and wealth has a positive eect on the amounts remitted by the migrant. Greater
landholdings, however, dampen the amount remitted for the migrants with loans, all else
equal. Third, the R-squared coecient for the group of migrants with loan obligations
is much higher relative to their non-loan peers (0.79 vs 0.46), which suggests that the
remittance behavior is less predictable for the latter group.
If we apply the indirect test of altruism based on household income, the previous
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Figure 2: Altruism and Remittances for Migrants with and without Loans
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analysis suggests that altruism does not seem to matter for the entire sample nor for each
group.12 We proceed to investigate how robust this conclusion is by using our constructed
measure of altruism. To further motivate our next specication that dierentiates across
the two groups of migrants, we provide scatter plots of altruism and remittances for
each group in Figure 2. We observe that for the migrants who report a monthly loan
obligation (right diagram), remittances increase in altruism. However, for those without
a loan obligation (left diagram), altruism is uncorrelated with remittances.
Our basic specication that accounts for altruism is as follows
lnR = a0 + a1 lnY + a2LOAN + a3ALTR + a4ALTR  LOAN + "; (2)
where lnY is the log of the annual income of a migrant; LOAN is a dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 if a migrant reports a monthly loan obligation and 0, otherwise; and
ALTR, a proxy of altruism, is the share of the endowment (in decimals) that a migrant
12A positive coecient on the household's income can instead be associated with exchange and invest-
ment motives, see Rapoport and Docquier (2006, Table 2).
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oers in the dictator game.
Table 4: Remittances, Loan Obligations, and Altruism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnY 0.623*** 0.617*** 0.624*** 0.614*** 0.575*** 0.648***
(0.082) (0.077) (0.075) (0.069) (0.065) (0.182)
LOAN 0.036 - 0.036 -0.232** -0.239** -0.171
(0.038) (0.039) (0.094) (0.112) (0.108)
ALTR -0.004 -0.009 -0.349 -0.409 2.477
(0.141) (0.142) (0.237) (0.282) (5.590)
ALTR*LOAN 0.727** 0.769*** 0.542*
(0.283) (0.301) (0.289)
Controls No No No No Yes Yes
ALTR*Controls No No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.57 0.60 0.67
Observations 105 105 105 105 105 105
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of remittances. The set of controls in columns 5 and
6 are those from Table 3. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses.
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Table 4 reports OLS estimates for various models of specication (2). Columns 1{
3 report the impact of altruism and of having a loan on remittance behavior for the
entire sample. Without an interaction between these two characteristics { i.e., when
treating the entire pool of migrant workers as homogeneous { neither having a loan nor
being altruistic matters. However, when we interact loan obligations with altruism, we
nd that both the loan dummy and the interaction term matter, as shown in column 4.
To check robustness, we included the set of control variables that were originally part
of specication (1) in Table 3. As shown in column 5, the magnitude and statistical
signicance of the loan variable and altruism-loan interaction variable do not change,
and no other control variables are individually or jointly signicant at conventional levels
(F-test of joint signicance yields a p-value of 0.52).
Finally, in column 6 of Table 4 we include additional interactive terms between the
set of control variables and the altruism measure. Besides mitigating concerns about
omitted variables, the purpose is to see whether the impact of altruism on the group of
migrants with loans stems from the possession of a loan per se rather than from other
13
migrant characteristics correlated with having a loan. The coecient on the altruism-
loan interactive term remains stable, which suggests, as discussed below in more detail,
that explicit loan obligations matter for the eect of the altruistic motive.13 We also
note that in column 6 the coecient of the loan variable became somewhat smaller in
the absolute value and is no longer signicant, which can be explained by that the added
control variables have some explanatory power on the decision to take a loan.
Several observations can be made based on the empirical results. First of all, for
the entire sample we nd no relationship between altruism and remittances. But we
nd a positive and statistically signicant relationship for the subsample of migrants
with a loan obligation, unlike the case when the indirect tests of altruism were applied.
Using estimates from column 5 of Table 4, for the migrant with a loan obligation a
10 percentage point increase in the contribution made in the dictator game translates
into a 3.6 percentage point higher remittance (p-value of 0.007). Furthermore, a negative
coecient on the dummy variable for loans indicates non-trivial dierences in the amounts
remitted across the two groups depending on the degree of altruism. If a migrant is selsh
(0% contribution), then he remits by 21.3% less if he has a loan, but if he is of the average
degree of altruism (a contribution of 37%), then he remits by 4.7% more if he has a loan.14
In other words, the remittance schedule in altruism estimated for the group of migrants
with loans crosses the corresponding schedule of the other group from below, as shown
in Figure 3.
As an additional robustness check, we also examine whether other variables, such
as the ones in vectors X and Z in specication (1), have any explanatory power when
interacted with the LOAN dummy. The results are reported in Table A2 in Appendix
A. Each column represents a version of specication (2), in which the variable ALTR is
replaced with a dierent variable. Aside from migrants' own income, no other explanatory
variable, including household income, in these regressions is statistically signicant at
13An F-test of the equality of the coecient on ALTR*LOAN in columns 4 and 6, and also between
columns 5 and 6 cannot be rejected (p-value of 0.54 and 0.44 respectively).
14The results are qualitatively similar using coecients from column 6 of Table 4. Evaluating at the
mean of the control variables, a 10% increase in contribution made in the dictator game is associated
with a 3.4 percentage point higher remittance for a migrant with a loan obligation. A migrant with a
loan who is selsh sends 17.1% less, while those at the average degree of altruism remits by 3% more.
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Figure 3: Observed Remittance Schedules in Altruism
conventional levels.
4 Reference Dependence
The nding that altruism does not explain remittance behavior for the entire sample is
in line with the view that the altruistic motive can be oset by other motives for remit-
tances or various confounding factors. Our study presents one such confounding factor.
Specically, possessing a loan obligation inuences remittance behavior and, particularly,
the extent to which altruism is a factor in determining remittances. To provide an ex-
planation for this nding, we turn to a model with reference-dependent preferences. The
basic idea underlying this analysis is that an explicit loan obligation brings more certainty
about the reference point for remittances.
The approach is to extend the remittance model of altruism (Lucas and Stark (1985),
Stark (1995, Ch. 1)) with reference dependence. Here, we highlight the main ingredi-
ents of our model and introduce it formally in Appendix C. In the model, a migrant
worker derives utility from own consumption and from his ability to remit enough to
meet a reference point for remittances. Specically, he experiences a psychological cost
or gain if his remittance is below or, respectively, above a reference point, with losses
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looming larger than gains. The intensity of the psychological factor is in proportion to
the migrant's degree of altruism. The reference point is the amount of money that the
migrant is expected to send home, as determined by existing obligations, family needs,
social comparisons, or other contextual circumstances. The reference point can be, how-
ever, uncertain, in which case the degree of uncertainty becomes an important factor for
remittance decisions (as in K}oszegi and Rabin (2006)).
Generally, utility theories of reference dependence are motivated by empirical evidence
about the eects of contextual circumstances on the individual perception of utility. These
eects are typically found to take the form of loss aversion with respect to some reference
point, determined by the decision maker's current position and expectations, as well as
by social norms and comparisons.15 Regarding remittance behavior, similarly to other
realms of economic behavior, there are strong reasons to believe that the subjective util-
ity of remittances depends on contextual circumstances. Examples of such circumstances
could be the history of remittances, individual or common beliefs about a "fair" amount
of remittances, recipients' expectations, family or peer pressures. In Gardner (2012),
a study on immigration to the Persian Gulf states, it is often family pressures that are
responsible for the decision to emigrate and for the amount of remittances to be sent
home (see Chort et al. (2012) for peer pressures on remitting behavior). The anthro-
pological study of Osella and Osella (2000) describes a local status categorization of
migrant workers from Kerala, based on their ability to earn money abroad, and privileges
associated with high status.
Returning to our study, we argue that possessing a loan obligation reduces uncertainty
about the reference point for remittances. This assumption can be motivated in two ways.
First, specic to our study, we observe that the two types of migrants, distinguished
by explicit loan obligations, earn and remit similar amounts and have otherwise very
similar socioeconomic backgrounds and consumption preferences. In particular, both
types report the same purpose of their loans or savings/remittances. When asked about
the purpose of their loans, most migrant workers with a loan obligation report a housing
15Recent applications of reference-dependent preferences include Abeler et al. (2011), Crawford and
Meng (2011), Pope and Schweitzer (2011).
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investment, whereas those without a loan report the same purpose among their top
priorities for remittance use. Thus, to the extent that satisfying this family need is a
major inuence on the expectation of how much should be remitted, then the presence
of a loan obligation provides greater certainty about this expectation and the reference
level for remittances. Second, and more generally, even if not exposed to explicit loan
obligations, migrants are frequently bound by implicit family loan contracts, typically
made to nance migration costs (for the relevance of such implicit loan contracts, see
Lucas and Stark (1985), Hoddinott (1994), and Poirine (1997)). Remittances are then
considered as dividends from the family investment, but explicit nancial requirements
{ which can include a loan obligation { create greater certainty about the exact size of
expected dividends for which a migrant is responsible.
Assuming that migrants without a loan obligation face more uncertainty about the
reference point is sucient for the model to produce predictions that match our empirical
ndings. (This assumption can be justied on the grounds of the lower value of the R-
squared coecient for the no-loan group in our empirical analysis.) Let migrants' level
of income be xed and independent of their degree of altruism. Consider a migrant who
remits a relatively small amount due to his low degree of altruism. Because of uncertainty
there is a risk that the amount remitted falls short of the reference point. An increase in
uncertainty also increases this risk, which prompts a loss-averse migrant to remit more as
a hedging measure against the increased risk. This explains the negative coecient of the
dummy variable for loans in our empirical results or rather why less altruistic migrants
without loans remit more. Now consider a migrant who remits a large amount due to his
high degree of altruism. The risk of falling short of the reference point is negligible even
with an increased degree of uncertainty. But because of the diminishing marginal utility
from remittances above the reference point, an increase in uncertainty prompts a migrant
to favor more private consumption and, as a result, to lower remittances. Technically, the
convexity of the reference-dependent function at low levels of remittance is responsible
for the increase in remittances in response to increased uncertainty, whereas its concavity
at high levels of remittance { for the decrease. This explains our empirical nding that
17
altruistic migrants remit more if they have a loan obligation, which, as we argue, is
tantamount to more certainty about the reference point for remittances. From a dierent
perspective, the model predicts a atter remittance schedule in altruism for migrants
without loan obligations in accordance with our empirical results.
5 Conclusion
We study the relationship between altruism and remittances of migrants, using a measure
of altruism elicited from the dictator game experiment. We nd that, overall, there is little
evidence of a universal relationship between altruism and remittances. However, we do
nd that the eect of altruism is much stronger on remitting behavior for migrants with
loan obligations. We argue that the altruistic motive is subdued by uncertainty about
remittance expectations and loss aversion. At the same time, the possession of loan
obligations may reduce uncertainty about remittance expectations, subsequently making
the altruistic motive more pronounced. Indirect tests may, however, fail to establish this
relationship between altruism and remittances.
In parallel to the literature on reference-dependent preferences, the current study
points to the importance of contextual circumstances for remitting behavior. As in other
realms of economic behavior, in migration such circumstances can play an important role
for the formation of reference points with subsequent eects on remittance decisions. In
our study, the contextual circumstance is the existence of an explicit loan obligation. As
a consequence, two similar groups can exhibit very dierent behavior, based on dierent
contextual circumstances and the eects that these have on reference levels. Relatedly,
Funkhouser (1995) documents a striking and puzzling dierence in migrants' remit-
tances sent to El Salvador and Nicaragua regardless of very similar country and migrant
characteristics, which could possibly be another incidence of reference dependence and
contextual circumstances.
Our ndings call for more research on the importance of reference dependence and
contextual factors for remittance behavior. For instance, the remittance model with
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reference-dependent preferences could also yield novel predictions on the eects of net-
works in explaining remittance behavior. As a migrant worker spends a substantial
amount of time interacting with his peers, the remittance behavior of his peers, who most
often come from the same community back home, may potentially inuence expectations
and reference levels and, through these, may also inuence the migrant's remittance
behavior.
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Appendix A. Tables and Figures
Figure A1: Distribution of Altruism
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Altruism: % of endowment offered in Dictator game
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Note: Altruism is measured as the fraction of endowment shared in a dictator game
Kernel density estimate
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Table A1: Determinants of Attrition in Campus Visits
(1) (2)
Migrant's income (ln) 0.122 0.0932
(0.126) (0.134)
Household income (IHST) 0.00446 0.00712
(0.012) (0.012)
Wealth (ln) 0.0132 -0.000871
(0.071) (0.071)
Age -0.00701 -0.00802
(0.006) (0.006)
Post high school (indicator) 0.12 0.0999
(0.118) (0.126)
Years employed in Qatar 0.00341 -0.00146
(0.008) (0.008)
Have loan (indicator) -0.0891 -0.106
(0.078) (0.080)
Household size in India -0.0061 -0.0199
(0.042) (0.043)
No. of bedroooms 0.0564 0.0646
(0.082) (0.084)
Motor car (indicator) -0.0889 -0.129
(0.167) (0.170)
Landline telephone (indicator) 0.0869 0.104
(0.085) (0.087)
Flat panel TV (indicator) -0.0734 -0.00318
(0.093) (0.099)
Refrigerator (indicator) 0.0405 0.0975
(0.096) (0.104)
Computer (indicator) 0.116 0.117
(0.138) (0.132)
Landholding (acres) 0.0272 0.0133
(0.069) (0.070)
Risk attitude - -0.0402
- (0.032)
Constant -0.685 -0.226
(1.270) (1.358)
R-squared 0.09 0.12
Observations 203 191
Notes: The dependent variable is a indicator if an individual did not make
a campus visit. Column 1 excludes 3 observations with remittance outliers
(above 3 standard deviations). Column 2 includes a risk-attitude measure
which 12 individuals did not provide.
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Table A2: Remittance Regression { Additional Specications
Interactive term T =
Age Post high
school
Years in
Qatar
Hhold
size
Wife in
SHG
Hhold
income
Wealth Land Risk at-
titude
lnY 0.615*** 0.598*** 0.622*** 0.628*** 0.619*** 0.620*** 0.615*** 0.631*** 0.644***
(0.081) (0.083) (0.078) (0.079) (0.083) (0.079) (0.083) (0.082) (0.078)
LOAN 0.625 0.041 0.072 0.177 0.058 0.020 -0.285 0.065 -0.114
(0.647) (0.038) (0.063) (0.238) (0.052) (0.035) (0.675) (0.048) (0.134)
T 0.115 0.103 0.005 0.088 0.071 -0.001 0.007 0.102 -0.026
(0.140) (0.092) (0.044) (0.144) (0.059) (0.014) (0.054) (0.066) (0.033)
T*LOAN -0.160 -0.030 -0.032 -0.109 -0.080 0.020 0.032 -0.112 0.046
(0.177) (0.197) (0.052) (0.174) (0.077) (0.016) (0.067) (0.072) (0.038)
R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
Observations 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of remittances. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses.
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Appendix B. Use of Remittance
The two groups of migrants with and without a loan are also similar with respect to their
preferences for spending remittances. The migrants were asked to report the expenses,
made out of their remittances, for dierent spending categories (including savings) during
the last 12 months. A summary of the results is available in Figure B1. Panel (a) shows
Figure B1: Uses of Remittances over the Last Year
(a) Average spending by category (US $) (b) Average spending by category (%)
average dollar spending by expenditure category and loan type, and Panel (b) shows the
corresponding expenditure shares for each group. As expected, we observe that migrants
without loans save more, but they also spend more under each category both in absolute
and relative numbers. However, if we take the post-repayment remittances and then
compare the expenditure shares between the two groups, then, except for the savings
category, we see much similarity among the migrants irrespective of whether they have a
loan obligation or not.16
16Arguably, Figure B1 points to a savings commitment problem among the migrants without loan
obligations, as their total savings are less than the sum of savings and loan repayments of the migrants
with a loan obligation. This observation is in line with the study of Bauer et al. (2012) on micronance
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Appendix C. Model
Consider a migrant worker who has to divide his earned income Y > 0 between remittance
R  0 sent to his family and private consumption, Y   R  0. The migrant's utility
from private consumption is given by function u(:) that satises u0(:) > 0 and u00(:) < 0.
The migrant's utility from remittance R that captures the family's welfare and their
expectations is given by an increasing function (R   R), where R is a reference point
for remittances. We assume that (:) satises the properties of a \universal gain-loss
function" in K}oszegi and Rabin (2006). Specically, the migrant experiences a negative
utility from remittance if R < R and a positive utility if R > R, where utility losses
resonate more than gains, i.e., 00(x) > 0 for x < 0 but 00(x) < 0 for x  0. The
reference point R is uncertain and, for analytical convenience, assumed to be uniformly
distributed over an interval [r   e; r + e]. The parameter e, 0 < e < r, measures the
migrant's uncertainty about the reference point.
Letting  > 0 denote the migrant's degree of altruism, measured as the weight the
migrant puts on his utility from remittance, we write the migrant's total utility as
U(R;Y; e) = u(Y  R) + 
Z r+e
r e
(R R) 1
2e
dR: (A.1)
The optimal remittance level, R = argmaxR U(R;Y; e), is determined by the rst-order
condition
 u0(Y  R) + 
2e
Z r+e
r e
0(R  R)dR = 0; (A.2)
which, by the fundamental theorem of calculus, can be expressed as
 u0(Y  R) + 
2e
((R   r + e)  (R   r   e)) = 0: (A.3)
Above, we assume the existence of an interior solution, which implies that the second-
order condition (SOC) is satised. From the internal derivative dR=d > 0 taken from
(A.3), we can establish that a higher degree of altruism results in larger remittances, and
loans in India, where they argue that the microcredit innovation may also help in fostering self-discipline
in nancial behavior.
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vice versa.
Now suppose that the migrant becomes less certain about the reference point R, which
we model by an increase in e. The eect of increased uncertainty on remittance is given
by the internal derivative
dR
de
=
2u0(Y  R)   (0(R   r + e) + 0(R   r   e))
SOC
: (A.4)
Rewrite this derivative using (A.3) as
dR
de
=

e
((e) ( e))
 SOC ; (A.5)
where
(e) = e0(R   r + e)  (R   r + e): (A.6)
The denominator of (A.5) is positive, but the numerator can be both positive and neg-
ative. In particular, it depends on the size of R, which is also to say on the degree of
altruism .
For smaller values of R (< r   e) so that (:) is convex, the numerator is positive
because 0(e) > 0. But for larger values of R (> r + e) so that (:) is concave, the
numerator turns negative because now 0(e) < 0. Then, by continuity we obtain a atter
remittance schedule when the degree of uncertainty increases. In words, loss aversion
prompts a migrant who turns less certain about remittance expectations to remit more
when he initially remitted little, which is done to avoid the increased risk of undershooting
the remittance target. At the same time, when the migrant initially remitted much,
increased uncertainty actually makes him reduce his remittance because now the risk of
overshooting the remittance target becomes higher.
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